

Review of Report to Congress by Defense Science Board Task Force Assessing the Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs

William E. Beasley

Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell,
Task Force Executive Secretary

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the continuing need to improve the Department's ability to rapidly respond to urgent warfighter requirements against a highly adaptive enemy. The Department has created or modified numerous urgent needs processes to assist in countering enemy threats by expediting the fielding of warfighter urgent operational needs. The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 directed the Secretary of Defense to commission a study and report to Congress to assess the effectiveness of the processes used by the Department of Defense for the generation and fulfillment of urgent operational needs. A Defense Science Board Task Force was established in December 2008 to conduct the study. Its report to Congress in July 2009 included recommendations for the Department of Defense to formalize two paths—one for urgent and the other for normal acquisitions; establish a \$3 billion per year fund for rapid acquisition and fielding; and establish a new Defense Agency, the Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency, to fulfill the urgent operational needs of the warfighter. Key members of the Department's new leadership have received this report and have incorporated it into their deliberations on how to more effectively support the current war in Afghanistan and Iraq and future operations.

Key words: Capabilities and limitations; Defense Science Board; JIEDDO; Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell; JRAC; JUON; MRAP; rapid acquisition; urgent operational needs.

"The essence of the problem at hand is the need to field militarily useful solutions faster."¹

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the continuing need to improve the Department's ability to rapidly respond to urgent warfighter requirements against a highly adaptive enemy. Toward this end, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to commission a study and report to Congress. The study was to assess the effectiveness of the processes used by the Department of Defense for the generation and fulfillment of urgent operational needs.² The Department was instructed to perform the assessment through the use of a federally funded research and development center or the use of an independent commission.

The Defense Science Board, a Department of Defense (DOD) independent commission, was selected to perform this study with representation from the Defense Business Board. To conduct the study, the Defense Science Board (DSB) established a task force in December 2008, which was sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, and the Director, Defense Research and Engineering. Its report was provided to Congress in July 2009.³

The Department has created or modified numerous urgent needs processes to assist in countering enemy threats by expediting the fielding warfighter requirements. New organizational structures have been created to fulfill warfighter urgent needs, including the Army's Rapid Equipping Force; Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization; Intelligence,

Report Documentation Page			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>					
<p>Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.</p>								
1. REPORT DATE JUN 2010	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2010 to 00-00-2010						
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Review of Report to Congress by Defense Science Board Task Force Assessing the Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER					
			5b. GRANT NUMBER					
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER					
6. AUTHOR(S)			5d. PROJECT NUMBER					
			5e. TASK NUMBER					
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Office of the Secretary of Defense ,Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell,Washington,DC,20301			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER					
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)					
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)					
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited								
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES								
14. ABSTRACT								
15. SUBJECT TERMS								
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 33%; padding: 5px;">a. REPORT unclassified</td> <td style="width: 33%; padding: 5px;">b. ABSTRACT unclassified</td> <td style="width: 33%; padding: 5px;">c. THIS PAGE unclassified</td> </tr> </table>			a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified	17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 10	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified						

Surveillance, Reconnaissance Task Force; Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Task Force; the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell; and, more recently, the Counter Improvised Explosive Device Senior Integration Group. These organizations and associated processes have quickly delivered multi-tens of billions of dollars of capability to the warfighter. These processes have garnered their fair share of oversight reviews and assessments by the Department of Defense Inspector General, Service Audit Agencies, the General Accounting Office, and congressionally directed assessments. One recent study reviewed many of the DoD urgent needs processes, assessed the processes with the various process owners, and reviewed the application of the processes by multiple program managers fulfilling the warfighters' urgent needs. Expedited test and evaluation was an underlying theme throughout this recent assessment.

I served as Executive Secretary to the DSB Task Force, and in the following pages I will provide additional background information, briefly describe the study's findings and recommendations, and provide some insight into the Department of Defense's approach to addressing the recommendations of the study's written report to Congress.

Background information

Members of the DSB Task Force included prior senior DoD and Service acquisition officials, a previous DoD Comptroller (also a member of the DoD Business Board), a recent member of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) from the prior administration charged with accelerating the transition of technology to acquisition programs, General Officers, and members from industry with expertise on rapidly developing new capabilities, and experts on special acquisition approaches and authorities. In the past, several of these Task Force members participated in studies⁴ that examined related issues, many of which made similar recommendations for change focused on expediting the acquisition and fielding of needed equipment.

The Honorable Dr. Jacques Gansler, who chaired the DSB Task Force, wrote in a memorandum to the Chairman of the Defense Science Board:

"The accelerated pace of change in the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by adversaries of the United States has heightened the need for a rapid response to new threats. Fielding systems in response to urgent operational needs over the past half decade has revealed that DOD lacks the ability to rapidly field new capabilities for the warfighter in a systematic and effective way."⁵

In this memorandum he summarized the critical actions needed to address the issue described. He further wrote that the implementation of the recommendations of the DSB Task Force was imperative to supplying the warfighter with the capabilities needed for success.

The DSB Task Force members were well aware that the regular or "deliberate" requirements, budgeting, and acquisition processes were not well suited to meeting urgent needs of the warfighter. Long-standing business practices and regulations are poorly suited to the dynamics of fulfilling urgent needs in a timeframe useful to the warfighter engaged in combat. The DOD is saddled with processes and oversight built up over decades, with managers leading them who are often trained to be risk averse. The "normal acquisition" system is a long chain of demanding, disciplined tasks that can take years and then only respond by exception to rapid changes. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System for requirements, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution for funding, and the DOD 5000 series for acquisition are examples of the processes that underpin a regular acquisition. Planning is insufficiently anticipatory. Processes are too inward-looking and do not sufficiently leverage the commercial or global market—nor do they sufficiently leverage the public sector—by coordinating with other agencies for solutions to needed capabilities.

The Task Force observed that progress has been made, but DoD's ad hoc "rapid" processes still experience unnecessary and bureaucratic delays in needs generation, vetting, fulfillment, and fielding. These processes continue to lack serious institutional commitment and very little is being built into the Service or other DoD budgets for these programs. The Task Force wrote:

"It is hard to criticize the industrious nature of those in the Department who have made something happen when urgent needs have been presented; however, these approaches do not offer a long-term solution to circumstances that will not go away once current contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan abate. As there is little doubt that the urgent needs from combatant commanders will continue, the bottom line is that the ability to field critical war fighting needs requires a new approach—a standing acquisition and fielding capability that can fulfill these requirements in a timely way" [emphasis in original].⁶

Findings of the Task Force

The following sections provide summaries of the major findings of the DSB Task Force.

Multiple acquisition goals

All of DOD's needs cannot be met by the same acquisition processes. The Task Force found that the time critical nature or the urgent needs of the warfighter engaged in ongoing military operations, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, require a requirements, acquisition, and fielding approach markedly different than those associated with the traditional Defense Acquisition System.

The Task Force noted that in the delivery of the 99% solution for traditional acquisitions the "JCIDS processes must be fully satisfied."⁷ Development testing, verification and validation, interoperability and supportability assessments, safety evaluations, and operational test and evaluation all are pieces of the processes that must be satisfied before a capability is fielded.

The Task Force found that speed is one of the most important attributes of fulfilling an urgent need. The 75% solution is not only acceptable but welcomed if it provides a capability for operational use sooner. While the Task Force did not discuss at length the need for expeditious testing of capabilities, the urgency of operational evaluation was recognized. In their report the Task Force wrote:

"As opposed to traditional acquisition, in which better equipment is often perceived as the only solution, an urgent need may be met with new tactics, new capabilities, new materiel—based on proven technologies—or a combination of these. Also in contrast to traditional acquisition, test and evaluation should not be a pass or fail test, but rather should be used to determine capabilities and limitations—an approach the Army has successfully used to decide whether potential solutions to urgent requirements are good enough to be deployed."⁸

The Task Force heard presentations by Service operational test agency leaders, multiple program managers delivering urgent needs to the warfighter, and prior and current leadership of the Joint IED Defeat Organization. There was wide agreement among Task Force members that the use of Capabilities and Limitations reports to inform the warfighters' decision to accept capability was needed to expeditiously fulfill the warfighters' most urgent needs.

It was noted by the Task Force that the level of testing is generally tailored to the capability to be provided to the warfighter. The mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle received extensive safety, operational, and live fire testing and continued testing after deployment. Counter Radio Controlled Impro-

vised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare systems received extensive operational and interoperability testing prior to deployment and continued surveillance after deployment.

The Task Force found that risks, unless appropriately mitigated, in a traditional acquisition program "[are] perceived as being a show stopper."⁹ On the contrary, successful acquisition of an urgently needed capability often involved accepting risk that was "transparent, acknowledged, understood, and weighed against the attendant risk of proceeding along a more deliberate route."¹⁰ Capabilities and Limitations reports provide an appropriate vehicle to characterize risks and enable the warfighter to actively participate in the fielding decisions of the urgent need.

"Rapid" is counter to the traditional acquisition culture

"Rapid" is countercultural and will be undersupported in traditional organizations. The DSB Task Force observed that "the current defense acquisition workforce is rewarded for following complex procedures with accuracy and precision and is punished for bypassing them."¹¹ The architects of the various successful urgent needs processes developed workarounds and established parallel acquisition paths to the traditional processes. The Task Force found examples in DoD, and in industry, where parallel processes proved effective in achieving the desired development or business outcomes. As examples, the establishment of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to address disruptive technologies was a separate parallel process to Service acquisitions that are focused on more traditional, incremental developments. In industry IBM established its personal computer division separately from its traditional mainframe division.

The Task Force stated that sustaining a rapid acquisition capability in the Department of Defense requires the active support of the requirements, resourcing, and the testing community and the establishment of a parallel acquisition option. They opined that a component of the traditional process will not work and a separate organization is required.

Use of proven technology is essential to rapid response

Any rapid response must be based on proven technology and robust manufacturing processes. The Task Force believes that to achieve rapid deployment of an urgent capability, mature technical solutions are required. Rapid delivery of "Block 1" capabilities with spiral development of additional capabilities is necessary. Where technical maturity

precluded rapid deployment of a capability, the Task Force recommends that the capability be developed, as a high priority, by the defense science and technology community.¹² The Joint IED Defeat Organization exemplifies an organization that both delivers proven technology and, through extensive science and technology efforts, reaches out to industry and academia to develop solutions to quickly evolving enemy threats.¹³

The DSB Task Force agreed that risks must be understood and the use of capabilities and limitations is an important element to the fulfillment of urgent needs. The report states:

“While there may be instances in which early fielding of prototypes with contractor logistics support is appropriate, the risks must be well understood and parallel efforts should be in place to mature the technology and to ensure that training and logistics are adequate for the system life cycle. An assessment of capabilities and limitations should be an integral part of the warfighter’s acceptance of the system for operational use.”¹⁴

Ad hoc organizations

Current approaches to implement rapid responses to urgent needs are not sustainable. The DSB Task Force found that many ad hoc processes were established to address urgent needs and that all, with senior level support, used workarounds to “sidestep traditional acquisition and fielding processes.”¹⁵ The Task Force found these processes disjointed, with little institutional memory or tracking of lessons learned. Some processes established for specific purposes had no sunset provision, and others appeared to be turning into bureaucratic organizations. The push for fulfilling wartime needs enabled the ad hoc processes to create workarounds to rapidly fielding capability. The Task Force observed that as the wartime push eases, the ability to be rapid will likely be reduced.

Urgent needs will endure beyond today’s conflicts, which led the Task Force to recommend the creation of a sustainable organizational capability for rapid acquisition and fielding. Rapid acquisition and fielding capability must “build on the advantages of current ad hoc processes that have found relief from the rigors of the formal, deliberate acquisition bureaucracy.”¹⁶

Lack of integrated triage

An integrated triage process is needed. There is a wide continuum of urgent needs ranging from ill-defined capability gaps to requests for additional supplies of standard equipment. The Task Force

recognized that even in a wartime situation, resources are limited, and thus the Task Force found that the triage of urgent needs is an important step. A higher level view of all needs and a wider view of potential solutions are required. The higher level view envisioned by the Task Force enables the allocation of resources to fulfill urgent needs. Game changing capabilities can be fielded through this triage process.¹⁷

Institutional barriers

Institutional barriers—people, funding, and processes—are powerful inhibitors to successful rapid acquisition and fielding of new capabilities. The primary issue raised by every witness before the Task Force was the availability of dedicated and flexible funds. The competition for funds to address even the most critical urgent needs are affected by institutional barriers established in Service Financial Management and OSD Comptroller processes, rules, and regulations; Office of Management and Budget overall wartime funding priorities; and the Congressional appropriations processes.

Task Force members believe that people must work in integrated teams to support the warfighters’ urgent needs and that success is achievable only if these integrated teams have “the best and brightest innovative thinkers who are solution-oriented, creative, and uninhibited by bureaucracy.”¹⁸

Needed best practices

The Task Force reviewed solutions to the shortfalls identified in their findings and assessed a number of best practices of the various urgent needs processes. Each of the Best Practices listed in Table 1 reflect attributes of solutions that deserve further evaluation. Note that the Army processes for test and evaluation of urgent needs, the Army Test and Evaluation Command’s Capabilities and Limitations process, is viewed as being “good.”

Recommendations of the Task Force

The major recommendations of the DSB Task Force are summarized in the following paragraphs.

The Secretary of Defense should formalize a dual acquisition path¹⁹

The Task Force viewed the deliberate and rapid acquisition processes as incompatible processes with different acquisition goals. They recommend a dual acquisition path, as depicted in *Figure 1*.

Deliberate acquisition process. The goal is a 99% solution, which often translates to delivery in 3 to 11 years or more. It is optimized for delivery of

Table 1. Best practices needed (DSB TF Report, 30).

Best practices needed	Where it's good today
For involving the warfighter from beginning to end of process	Joint Capability Technology Demonstration, Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
For obtaining agile, flexible funding	Joint IED Defeat Organization, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Program (MRAP)
To coordinate status and resolution for each need statement	USSOCOM
For coordinating technology development	Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), U.S. Air Force Big Safari
To evaluate effectiveness of the implemented solution	USSOCOM, AWG
For test and evaluation	Army
To determine whether to end or to transition each implementation	—
For a knowledgeable workforce for all rapid acquisitions	U.S. Air Force Big Safari
For business approaches that use existing flexibilities	DDR&E, Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, U.S. Air Force Big Safari, MRAP
For institutionalizing the rapid response process	Navy/Marine Corps
For collaborative innovation	Private sector

complex systems and is scalable to very large military solutions. It uses detailed, extensive, and large-scale oversight and synchronization to ensure success. It includes resources for sustainment and is well adapted to individual Service cultures. Owing to the long time frame, this process often begins by pushing the state of the art of the underlying technologies.

Rapid acquisition process. This process is satisfied with a 75% solution or sometimes less, with the major focus on delivery within 24 months. To be responsive to combatant command timelines, the Task Force recommended that execution be decentralized. Participation by small and nontraditional businesses is

sought. Risk is mitigated through the use of proven technology that is rapidly transitioned via competitive prototyping. More advanced or extensive capabilities are provided in subsequent builds through spiral development. Resources for sustainment and training are integrated and delivered in parallel with initial operating capability.

The Task Force also recommended a standard DoD-wide definition be established for an urgent need to enable effective triage of the acquisition path (deliberate or rapid). “The definition should state that an urgent need is one that *if left unfulfilled, will seriously endanger personnel and/or pose a major threat to ongoing or imminent operations*” [emphasis in original].²⁰




Figure 1. Dual acquisition path proposed (DSB TF Report, 32).




Figure 2. Fifty billion dollars allocated 2005–May 2009 to joint urgent operational needs (DSB TF Report, 11).

Executive and legislative branches must establish a fund for rapid acquisition and fielding²¹

As depicted in *Figure 2*, the Department allocated, in less than 4 years during ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, approximately \$50 billion to fulfill Joint Urgent Operational Needs. The Services, other Defense components (U.S. Special Operations Command, Defense agencies, etc.), and the intelligence community expended significant additional funds to fulfill their specific urgent operational needs. These wartime expenditures for urgent needs informed the DSB Task Force in arriving at a recommended funding level of 0.5% of the DoD budget, roughly \$3 billion dollars per year, to support rapid acquisition and fielding.

The Task Force anticipated similar funding needs for the foreseeable future; however, they stressed that

the funding should not be contingent upon an ongoing war. In periods without an ongoing war, the funds would support rapid acquisition of capability that is needed more rapidly than the regular requirements, acquisition, and budget processes would allow.

The Secretary of Defense should establish a new agency: the Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency²²

The Task Force recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish a new agency: the Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency (RAFA) “focused on speed, utilizing existing technologies and acquisition flexibilities to get a 75 percent solution—initially adequate to address the urgent needs of the warfighter.”²³ It was also recommended that each Service establish a rapid acquisition organization that would work in close collaboration with the RAFA. While various organi-




Figure 3. Notional comparisons of organization responsibilities and timelines (DSB TF Report, 34).




Figure 4. Representative DoD processes, funds, and organizations addressing urgent needs/rapid acquisition (DSB TF Report, 19; see glossary for explanation of acronyms, 57–61).

izational constructs were discussed, no specific internal organization of the RAFA was recommended. It was recommended that the RAFA report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and have a dotted line to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A key recommendation was that the RAFA be headed by a three-star-level active duty officer to maintain a strong and persistent relationship with the warfighter.

This recommendation is not intended to create an organization with responsibilities that overlap with those of other established organizations. *Figure 3* depicts the DSB Task Forces notional view of how the RAFA would fit with two existing organizations and Service and DoD Components acquisition organizations under the purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

The Task Force recommendation described at some length RAFA's mission “*to rapidly address combatant command needs with proven and emerging technologies in 2 to 24 months*” [emphasis in original]²⁴ and “*to provide integrated triage for incoming needs from combatant commands*” [emphasis in original].²⁵ The operational

assessment of capability provided through the RAFA was not explicitly addressed in the discussion of the RAFA's mission; however, the Task Force, as described elsewhere in their report, recognized the need for expedited operational assessment of an urgent capability upon which the receiving warfighter could make informed decisions to accept the capability.

Initial funding and billets for RAFA will be based on absorbing and integrating existing programs and organizations²⁶

The Task Force recognized the potential difficulties with establishing a new Defense Agency. Therefore, they recommended that initial funding and billets for the RAFA should be based on absorbing and integrating existing ad hoc efforts in the OSD. Some of these organizations are depicted in the DoD top-level organization chart in *Figure 4*. Specifically recommended by the Task Force is the use of the Department's Rapid Reaction Fund and Quick Reaction Fund and the billets of the Rapid Reaction Technology Office, the JRAC, and the Joint Concept Technology Demonstration program. It should be

noted that the Task Force recommended the use of existing billets and not necessarily the aggregation of the personnel in the present organizations into the new RAFA. Discussion during Task Force deliberations clearly indicated that the personnel filling the RAFA billets should be specially selected.²⁷

DoD should establish a streamlined, integrated approach for rapid acquisition²⁸

The Task Force recommended that the RAFA provide continuous oversight of all steps in the urgent needs process and also provide a liaison to the combatant command that authored the urgent need statement. The RAFA director should have acquisition and funding decision responsibility, and RAFA and the combatant command should jointly approve and validate the need, concept of operations, and the proposed initial operating capability. The Task Force recommended tightly coordinated needs, acquisition, and funding steps as a critical feature of the overall process. They further recommended that execution be concurrently tracked while considerations are evaluated and an initial operating capability is approved. Successful completion of these steps leads directly to production and fielding of an initial operating capability and a transition to production or sustainment and operation funding. The Task Force recommended that the RAFA and each Service jointly manage production (as appropriate), and RAFA work with each Service to integrate doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities and life cycle issues.

Summary and status of implementation of DSB Task Force recommendations

The six major findings supported the five major recommendations of the DSB Task Force on the Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs.

1. formalize a dual acquisition path,
2. establish a fund for rapid acquisition and fielding,
3. establish a new agency: the Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency,
4. provide initial funding and billets for RAFA from existing programs and organizations,
5. establish a streamlined, integrated approach for rapid acquisition.

Since January 20, 2009, the new administration has appointed new leaders to key DoD positions who have either been briefed or provided copies of the report for their consideration in establishing the way forward to meeting warfighters' urgent operational needs.

Public discussion of the DSB Task Force study, findings, and recommendations occurred in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Acquisition Reform Panel, October 8, 2009. The Hon. Dov S. Zakheim, a previous DoD Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, current member of the Defense Business Board, and a member of the DSB Task Force, testified. His testimony strongly supported the findings and the recommendations contained in the DSB Task Force Report, including the need for a separate acquisition path for urgent needs, a separate Defense Agency, and the establishment of a fund to support the fulfillment of urgent needs.²⁹ The Hon. Dov Zakheim emphasized the following in his testimony:

"Put simply, the department needs to field militarily useful solutions more quickly. The current threat environment is one in which the enemy on the battlefield employs easily obtainable, off-the-shelf technology to undermine the effectiveness of U.S. military operations. Yet DoD has made no permanent institutional changes in its acquisition, programmatic and budgetary systems to account for the growing sophistication and flexibility of the threat."³⁰

He went on to testify on the need for support for urgent needs processes by testing and other communities:

"The defense acquisition workforce has for many years functioned in an environment that rewards following complex procedures with accuracy and precision, but penalizes those who take shortcuts around those procedures. Yet it is precisely creativity and 'workarounds' that are critical to meeting urgent requirements successfully and in a timely fashion. Sustaining an effective rapid acquisition capability therefore will call for the active support of the testing, resourcing and requirements communities in an unprecedented manner."³¹

Testimony of a current DoD official argued that the present "deliberate" acquisition system also should become more agile in meeting the Department's requirements. His written statement included the following:

"A July 2009 congressionally-directed study by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs concluded that existing institutions and procedures are incapable of meeting the Department's need

for rapid and agile acquisition in time of war. Consequently, the study recommended two separate acquisition structures: one for 'deliberate' acquisitions, and one for 'rapid' acquisitions. While the Department continues to review the recommendations of that study, the risk of accepting two distinct structures is a failure to accept that all acquisitions, wartime and peacetime, need to become more agile and responsive in order to keep pace with accelerating development cycles enabled through global access to information and incorporation of commercial technology, especially information and communications systems, in any potential adversary's arsenal. To prepare the Department for the agile threats we must surely anticipate in the future, we need to make our 'deliberate' processes much more relevant to the current fight and capable of responding to urgent needs.³²

He further stated:

*"Under the leadership of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) Dr. Ash Carter, and his Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Mr. Zach Lemnios, we have restructured the Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering to emphasize the rapid fielding of new technologies, while continuing the invaluable work of discovering and expanding the science for future capabilities. It's not enough to simply respond to new threats. Within the Director of Defense Research and Engineering organization, we consolidated hitherto disparate functions and created a new Rapid Fielding Office charged with discovering the best and most relevant technologies from the commercial and public sector and, when appropriate, facilitating their rapid fielding to theater. This new office is working to better integrate the science and technology with demonstration and prototype efforts throughout the Department and to focus those efforts on supporting the current fight. ... The Rapid Fielding Office has also taken over responsibility for the Department's Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), to ensure better synergy between the requirements, acquisition and research communities."*³³

The full set of the DSB Task Force's recommendations is under consideration by the Department of Defense. The study and report to Congress provides a valuable starting point to discuss the future fulfillment of urgent needs. □

WILLIAM BEASLEY, a career Department of Defense civilian, serves in the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), Office of the Secretary of Defense. He operated the JRAC from September 2007–March 2009 and also served as a member of the Joint IED Defeat Organization's Senior Resource Steering Group. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy and holds advanced degrees from Long Island University (MBA), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Physics), and the U.S. Army War College (Strategic Studies). He is a member of the Defense Acquisition Corps and is Level III Certified in Systems Planning, Research, Development and Engineering. He has been actively involved, since its inception, with the Joint Staff's Joint Capability Integration and Development System. He has over 35 years' experience in the military and with industry operating, managing, and developing military and cross federal agency information technology capabilities at all levels—tactical through national, in wartime, peacetime, disaster, and continuity of government roles. E-mail: William.Beasley@osd.mil or William.Beasley1@us.army.mil

Endnotes

¹U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs*. Washington, DC, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, July 2009, 41 <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA503382.pdf> (Accessed April 23, 2010).

²Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Public Law 110–417, 110th Cong., 2nd Sess. (October 14, 2008), Section 801: "Assessment of Urgent Operational Needs Fulfillment."

³*Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs* (DSB TF Report), 61–63.

⁴Key prior studies include:

- U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on 21st Century Strategic Technology Vectors*, Vol. I, Washington, DC, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, February 2007 [<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA463361.pdf> (accessed April 23, 2010)].
- U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Industrial Structure for Transformation – Creating an Effective National Security Industrial Base for the 21st Century: An Action Plan to Address the Coming Crisis*, Washington, DC, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, July 2008 [<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA485198.pdf> (accessed April 23, 2010)].
- U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Integrating Commercial Systems into the DoD, Effectively and Efficiently – Buying Commercial: Gaining the Cost/Schedule Benefits for Defense Systems*, Washington, DC, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, February 2009 [<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA494760.pdf> (accessed April 23, 2010)].
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Defense Acquisitions: Perspectives on Potential Changes to Department of Defense Acquisition Management Framework*, Washington, DC, February 27, 2009 [<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getpt?GAO-09-295R>, accessed April 23, 2010].
- U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board – Creating a DOD Strategic Acquisition Platform*, Washington, DC, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

- Technology and Logistics, April 2009, [<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA499566.pdf> (April 23, 2010)].
- U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise*. Volume I: Main Report, Washington, DC, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, September 2009, [<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA506396.pdf> (accessed April 23, 2010)].
- U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise*. Volume II: Supporting Papers, Washington, DC, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, January 2010, [<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA513074.pdf> (accessed April 23, 2010)].

⁵Hon. Jacques S. Gansler, "Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs," memorandum for Chairman of the Defense Science Board, Washington, DC, June 23, 2009. Included in DSB TF Report, iii–iv.

⁶DSB TF Report, 6.

⁷Ibid., 24.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid., 25.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., 26

¹³Ibid., See Figure B–3, 44.

¹⁴Ibid., 26.

¹⁵Ibid., 27.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., 28.

¹⁸Ibid., 29.

¹⁹Ibid., 31–32.

²⁰Ibid., 32.

²¹Ibid., 32–33.

²²Ibid., 33–37.

²³Ibid., 33.

²⁴Ibid., 35.

²⁵Ibid., 36.

²⁶Ibid., 38.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid., 38–40.

²⁹Dov S. Zakheim, Statement before the Defense Acquisition Reform Panel, House Committee on Armed Services, October 8, 2009. http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/DAR100809/Zakheim_Testimony100809.pdf. (Accessed April 23, 2010).

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid. Thomas P. Dee, Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Statement before The House Armed Services Committee Acquisition Reform Panel, October 8, 2009. http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/DAR100809/Dee_Testimony100809.pdf. (Accessed April 23, 2010).

³³Ibid.



The Annual ITEA Technology Review

Emerging Technologies for Future T&E Capabilities

- Unique in Format
- Broad in Opportunity
- Focused on Technologies Poised to Make a Dramatic Impact on T&E

July 20–22, 2010

Charleston, South Carolina

Register on line at

WWW.ITEA.ORG

Distinguished keynote speakers and subject-matter experts will discuss highlighted systems and technologies that will fuel future test capabilities. Together, we will identify the obstacles that must be overcome in adapting new technologies to meet testing challenges. Each session contains an open forum for participants to discuss the technology challenges and issues that need to be solved to meet requirements for tomorrow's test capabilities.

PANEL DISCUSSIONS

- Cyber Security and Data Fusion
- Unmanned Aircraft Systems

TRACKS

- Cyber Security*
- T&E of Human System Technologies*
- Data Fusion*
- Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs)*
- Instrumentation
- Power and Energy for T&E
- Real Time Hyper-spectral Scene Generation

* Topics may include unclassified and classified sessions.

TUTORIALS

- Design of Experiments (DOE) for Real-World Problems
- The Test and Training Enabling Architecture (TENA) and the Joint Mission Environment Test Capability (JMETC) Enabling Interoperability among Ranges, Facilities, and Simulations
- Redefining Boundaries

SPONSORS

- Scientific Research Corporation
- Georgia Tech Research Institute
- Imagine One Technology & Management

GOLF

The newly established ITEA South Carolina Chapter will be hosting their first Golf Tournament with a 9:00 am shotgun start on Tuesday, July 20, at the Patriots Point Links on Charleston Harbor (www.PatriotsPointLinks.com). Hole sponsorships are available and all the proceeds will go toward our newly established scholarship program! For more information on registering visit the ITEA website.

PROGRAM CHAIR
Mark Brown, Ph.D.

TECHNICAL CHAIR
Mr. David Smoak
smoak@itea.org

TECHNICAL CO-CHAIR
Mr. Michael Greco
greco@itea.org